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TERM OF THE WISCONSIN SUPREME
COURT
(AUGUST, 1973 - AUGUST, 1974)
CIVIL PROCEDURE
I. PRE-TRIAL
A.. Jurisdiction
Since the landmark decision of Pennoyer v. Neffl the power of
state courts to extend jurisdiction to non-resident corporate defen-
dants has been expanded considerably. The critical threshold deter-
mination of whether the particular facts and circumstances provide
an adequate basis for personal jurisdiction turns on the question
of whether the transaction has the necessary qualitative relation-
ship to the forum state. In Wisconsin, such jurisdiction is acquired
by satisfying the requisites under Wisconsin Statute section 262.05
and also by satisfying the constitutional requirements of due pro-
cess. Wisconsin has established a method for evaluating the im-
portance of jurisdictional contacts in relation to the due process
requirements.' In the recent Wisconsin Supreme Court decision of
Afram v. Balfour, Maclaine, Inc.3 the court was presented with
precisely such a jurisdictional determination.
The controversy in the Afram case arose from the circumstan-
ces surrounding a transaction in the silver futures market. The
plaintiff-respondent Afram was a speculator in the metal ex-
changes and a Wisconsin resident. He maintained margin accounts
with two corporations operating as commodity brokers. One ac-
count was held with the defendant-appellant Balfour, Maclaine,
Inc. (hereinafter Balfour), a New York corporation with its princi-
pal place of business in New York City, and a member of the
Commodity Exchange, Inc. The other account was with Maclaine,
Watson & Co., Ltd. (hereinafter Watson), whose office was in
London and participated in the London Metal Exchange. By rea-
son of agreement between the two corporations, Afram was able
1. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
2. Zerbel v. H. L. Federman & Co., 48 Wis. 2d 54, 65, 179 N.W.2d 872, 878 (1970);
Nagel v. Crain Cutter Co., 50 Wis. 2d 638, 648, 184 N.W.2d 876, 881 (1971).
3. 63 Wis. 2d 702, 218 N.W.2d 288 (1974).
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to use the services of Balfour to communicate to Watson for plac-
ing orders on the London exchange.
On February 5, 1969, Afram telephoned Balfour to place an
order with Watson for the sale of 40,000 Troy ounces of silver at
209 pence per Troy ounce. This was completed, and the sale was
set for September 5, 1969. Afram wired Balfour on June 19, 1969
to purchase enough silver, which was then 163.5 pence per Troy
ounce, to cover the upcoming sale. Balfour claimed that the order
on February 5 was a purchase and not a sale, and therefore refused
to make this recent requested purchase. Due to this failure of
Balfour to purchase at the lower price, Afram claimed he had lost
$17,950 that he would have otherwise made. On July 20, 1970
Balfour was served with process in New York City. In its answer,
Balfour contested the jurisdiction of the Wisconsin court over its
person.
At a hearing on the issue of jurisdiction, the plaintiff based
personal jurisdiction on Wisconsin's long-arm statute sections
262.05(l)(d) and 262.05(5).' The trial court judge found for the
plaintiff and noted specifically that section 262.05(5)(a) was satis-
fied. Balfour appealed, and the supreme court reversed.
Preliminarily, the court stated that the trial court had erred in
4. WIS. STAT. § 262.05(l)(d) and (5) (1971) provides:
A court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter has jurisdiction over
a person served in an action pursuant to s. 262.06 under any of the following circum-
stances:
(1) LOCAL PRESENCE OR STATUS. In any action whether arising within or with-
out this state, against a defendant who when the action is commenced:
(d) Is engaged in substantial and not isolated activities within this state, whether
such activities are wholly interstate, or otherwise.
(5) LOCAL SERVICES, GOODS, OR CONTRACTS. In any action which:
(a) Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some third
party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant to perform services within this state
or to pay for services to be performed in this state by the plaintiff; or
(b) Arises out of services actually performed for the plaintiff by the defendant
within this state, or services actually performed for the defendant by the plaintiff
within this state if such performance within this state was authorized or ratified by
the defendant; or
(c) Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some third
party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant to deliver or receive within this state
or to ship from this state goods, documents of title, or other things of value, or
(d) Relates to goods, documents of title, or other things of value shipped from
this state by the plaintiff to the defendant on his order or direction; or
(e) Relates to goods, documents of title, or other things of value actually re-
ceived by the plaintiff in this state from the defendant without regard to where
delivery to carrier occurred.
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assigning the burden of proof on the jurisdiction question to the
defendant. The burden of proof on the jurisdiction question must
always be carried by the plaintiff. However, the supreme court
would not reverse on that ground because to do so would have been
unfair to Balfour. Balfour had correctly raised the objection to
jurisdiction throughout, and to reverse on the error of the burden
of proof would not go to the merits of this objection. Therefore,
the supreme court proceeded to deal directly with the issue of
personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant.
The court found that the facts and circumstances of Afram
were insufficient to meet any of the provisions of section 262.05
upon which the plaintiff based his claim.
The facts were disputed as to Balfour's business activities in
Wisconsin. This was a result of the plaintiff's failure to assume the
burden of proof, and the trial judge's failure to make findings of
fact. Due to these disputed facts, and the undisputed evidence that
at the time the action was commenced, Balfour had no customers
in Wisconsin, the court found that Afram had failed to prove that
jurisdiction could be asserted under 262.05(l)(d).
In respect to jurisdiction under 262.05(5), the court pointed to
what it termed the "salient facts."
The New York brokerage house of Balfour was not the con-
tracting party in the disputed telephone conversation of February
5, 1969. Its only function was to relay the order to Watson, the
London broker. The written confirmation of the transaction
came in this case, as it routinely did, not from Balfour in New
York, but from Watson in London, in a form that specified that
the only parties to the agreement were Watson and Afram. Pro-
ceeds or deficits were to be paid only by those parties. The record
shows that Watson sent checks in pounds sterling directly to
Afram until Afram requested as a convenience that the conver-
sion to dollars be made for him by Balfour. Although there was
some evidence that in some cases the transaction in London was
immediately confirmed by Balfour to Afram, there was no proof
of that in this instance.'
Personal jurisdiction under section 262.05(5) is based upon a sub-
stantial relationship between the transaction and the forum state.
Thus, in the Afram case, because the transaction was essentially
one between Afram and Watson, with Balfour merely a convenient
5. 63 Wis. 2d at 708, 218 N.W.2d at 292.
6. Id. at 709, 218 N.W.2d at 292.
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transmittal agent, Balfour actually had no consequential relation-
ship to the transaction. Therefore, the plaintiff had presented a
situation in which as between he and the defendant there was no
transaction from which his claim arose with a statutorily substan-
tial relationship to Wisconsin.
After examining the facts, 262.05(5)(a) was not applicable be-
cause the transaction did not contemplate Balfour either perform-
ing services within Wisconsin or paying for services performed in
Wisconsin. Section 262.05(5)(b) was equally inapplicable in that
neither Afram nor Balfour actually performed services in Wiscon-
sin for the other. Sections 262.05(5)(c), (d), and (e) also failed to
be satisfied because no goods, documents of title, or other things
of value were promised to be delivered or actually delivered to or
from Wisconsin by either the plaintiff or the defendant to the
other.
The importance of Afram rests upon its effect on the applica-
tion of the two-step test for personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant. The first step is satisfaction of the long-arm
statute, while the second step is satisfaction of constitutional due
process requirements through the process of evaluation of jurisdic-
tional contacts adopted in Zerbel v. H. L. Federman & Co.7 and
Nagel v. Crain Cutter Co.' In Zerbel, Wisconsin's jurisdiction was
found duly exercised after satisfaction of the statute and appraisal
of the jurisdictional contacts to meet due process. In Nagel, al-
though the court found the statute was not satisfied, it nevertheless
dealt with the question of sufficient contacts to satisfy due process
requirements in support of its conclusion. The court in Afram held
that the jurisdictional contact evaluation was totally unnecessary
because the plaintiff had failed to establish jurisdiction under sec-
tion 262.05.
The Afram court was prompted to make this statement in
respect to the interplay between the long-arm statute and due pro-
cess requirements:
While we have adopted a methodology of appraising jurisdic-
tional contacts (citation omitted) such analysis is unnecessary
here. The standards set by sec. 262.05, Stats., if met, prima facie
meet the constitutional demands of Pennoyer v. Neff(1877)(cita-
tion omitted) and International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945),
326 U.S. 310, 66 Sup.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95. If the transaction has
the necessary qualitative relationship to the forum as spelled out
7. 48 Wis. 2d 54, 179 N.W.2d 872 (1970).
8. 50 Wis. 2d 638, 184 N.W.2d 876 (1971).
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in the various subsections of sec. 262.05, the constitutional objec-
tion is prima facie at least surmounted. What is listed are situa-
tions or transactions in which it is not unfair or a denial of due
process to extend Wisconsin's long-arm of jurisdiction to a non-
resident defendant. 9
Thus, Afram further clarifies the jurisdictional test by demonstrat-
ing that the jurisdictional contacts evaluation is only necessary
when section 262.05 is first satisfied, and thus, was not necessary
to the disposition in Nagel.
In a broader sense, the Afram case also provided an opportun-
ity for the supreme court to apply the jurisdictional doctrines to a
set of facts not previously presented for such a determination.
"Each case arising under the statute poses a problem of statutory
construction within the constitutional framework and its applica-
tion to the factual background of each individual case."' " Such
opportunities are essential in jurisdictional analysis to aid in estab-
lishing the factual limit at which jurisdiction may be established.
Among the "salient facts" noted by the court, Balfour's status as
a mere transmittal agent, with the only mutual obligations existing
between other parties, appears to be an important factor in the
court's analysis within section 262.05. Thus, Afram, in demon-
strating a limitation on the reach of Wisconsin's long-arm statute,
offers valuable guidance as to what the supreme court will consider
as significant facts in determining the issue of personal jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant.
B. Parties
The difficult problem of compulsory party joinder was the sub-
ject of controversy in the recent case of Heifetz v. Johnson." The
result was a landmark decision of procedural law by the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin.
Plaintiff-respondent Heifetz suffered personal injury in an au-
tomobile collision caused by the defendant-appellant's negligence.
Plaintiff's insurer, Heritage Mutual Insurance Company, paid
$2,000 toward plaintiff's medical expenses and in return received a
"subrogation receipt and assignment." Suit was commenced
against the defendant and her insurer nine days before the statute
of limitations had run. Plaintiff did not join Heritage as a party
9. 63 Wis. 2d at 713, 218 N.W.2d at 294.
10. Zerbel v. H. L. Federman & Co., 48 Wis. 2d 54, 60, 179 N.W.2d 872, 875 (1970).
11. 61 Wis. 2d 111,211 N.W.2d 834 (1973).
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plaintiff or reduce his claim by the $2,000 he had already received.
In a motion for summary judgment the defendant contended that
Heritage was an indispensable party and that failure to join Heri-
tage was thus ineffective to toll the running of the statue of limita-
tions. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment.
The supreme court chose to deal with this controversy in terms
of two issues:
(1) Did the failure of the plaintiffs to join a necessary or
indispensable party within the period of limitations subject the
plaintiff's cause of action to the defense of limitations of actions?
(2) If the plaintiffs right of action is not barred, can the
defendants raise the prior payment of $2000 by the plaintiffs
insurer in mitigation of their liability? 2
The supreme court affirmed the trial court and concluded as
to the first issue that such a failure to join an indispensable party
did not block the tolling of the statute of limitations. Secondly, it
was held that the plaintiff could not recover the full amount of
damages including the $2,000 in medical payments paid by his
insurer from the defendants. The court's disposition of the issues
was based on sound legal reasoning as well as solid practical con-
siderations.
The case of Borde v. Hake" appeared to provide a legal pre-
cedent upon which the defendant Johnson could rely to support his
claim that the failure to join Heritage failed to toll the running of
the statute of limitations. In Borde, the plaintiff had failed to join
its partially subrogated insurer just as in Heifetz. The supreme
court affirmed the trial court's decision to suspend the suit for
twenty days so that the indispensable insurer could be joined. The
statute of limitations was not involved. However, in dicta, the court
said:
We conclude that, until such time as (the insurer) was joined,
the plaintiffs cause of action brought without the joinder of a
necessary party was wholly ineffectual to stop the running of the
statute of limitations.'"(citation omitted)
In Heifetz, the court was prompted to withdraw any language in
Borde to such an effect.
In Patitucci v. Gerhardt,"5 it was held that when an insured
12. Id. at 114, 211 N.W.2d at 836.
13. 44 Wis. 2d 22, 170 N.W.2d 768 (1969).
14. Id. at 31, 170 N.W.2d at 772.
15. 206 Wis. 358, 240 N.W. 385 (1932).
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accepts partial payment from its insurer, the insurer is assigned pro
tanto that portion of the claim, and so subrogated, the insurer
becomes an indispensable party.
Thus, because Heritage's claim was barred by the statute of
limitations, a classic mandatory joinder dilemma was presented.
Had the failure to join a now unjoinable indispensable party cre-
ated a defect such that in effect no action had been commenced,
and therefore the running of the statute of limitations had extin-
guished the entire cause of action?
The court conceded that if failure to join an indispensable party
was a jurisdictional defect, then the statute of limitations could not
have been tolled. Whether such a defect goes to the jurisdiction of
the court is an issue upon which the various courts do not agree.,6
However, the court in Wisconsin rejected the jurisdictional defect
approach, adopting a more pragmatic view as reflected in the Min-
nesota case of Doerr v. Warner:7
It is well established that, although a court may not proceed
to judgment in a case in which an indispensable party is absent,
the reason therefor is not that the court does not have the juris-
diction, but for the broader reason that in the exercise of due
process no court, regardless of its jurisdictional structure, may
adjudicate directly upon a person's rights without such person
being either actually or constructively before the court."
In its discussion the supreme court considered and rejected the
analogy of the relationship of an injured plaintiff and his subro-
gated insurer to the relationship of joint owners of an interest. It
is well settled that the statute of limitations is not tolled when less
than all of the owners bring an action regarding an interest held
jointly. 9 The court based its rejection of such an analogy on the
distinction that the shares of joint owners, for example joint payees
on a note, are not individually identifiable and severable from the
whole, while the shares of the mutually-held interest of an injured
plaintiff and the subrogated insurer may be proportionately deter-
mined and are severable. "Each actually owns separately a part of
the liability of the tortfeasor. . . .Thus it is better to think of the
insurer as assignee of part of the claim than to speak of the insured
and the insurer as joint owners of the claim.""°
16. 59 Am. JUR. 2d Parties § 260 (1971).
17. 247 Minn. 98, 76 N.W.2d 505 (1956).
18. Id. at 103, 104, 76 N.W.2d at 511.
19. See Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 6, 31, § 11 (1949).
20. 61 Wis. 2d at 120, 211 N.W.2d at 839.
1975]
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To impose the necessity of joinder of all parties in interest in
this type of case would not serve the purpose of the mandatory
joinder statutes in Wisconsin,"' which is to protect the defendant
from multiplicity of suits and to afford due process to the claim
of the unjoined party. Since the insurer's claim in Heifetz was
barred by the statute of limitations, the purpose of the statute
could be accomplished without jeopardizing the rights of the plain-
tiff by destroying his claim.
The supreme court's disposition in Heifetz has significantly
clarified Wisconsin law on the question as to the result when an
interested party cannot be joined. As a matter of practical applica-
tion and legal result, the Wisconsin law on the subject now operates
substantially the same as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 19(b) sets out the methodology by which the court shall pro-
ceed in the event that an interested party cannot be joined. Appli-
cation of such in Heifetz most certainly would have produced the
same legal result. Rule 19(b) states:
.. . [T]he court shall determine whether in equity and good
conscience the action should proceed among the parties before
it, or should be dismissed. . . . The factors to be considered by
the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the
person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already
parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provision in the
judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the preju-
dice can be lessened or avoided, third, whether a judgment ren-
dered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether
the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dis-
missed for misjoinder.22
The reasoning employed in the Heifetz case has thus reshaped
the procedural doctrine regarding compulsory joinder in Wiscon-
sin. A party must be joined if he claims a material interest in one
of the rights or liabilities which may be affected by the litigation.
In the event that such a party for some reason cannot be joined,
the court will determine, basically through application of due pro-
cess principles, whether the controversy may be adjudicated in his
absence. It appears that if an unobtainable party's share of the
interest is determinable and severable from the shares of those
joined, he will be found dispensable. On the other hand, only those
parties whose shares of an interest are so united that they may be
21. WIs. STAT. 260.12 and 260.13 (1971).
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
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considered joint owners of that interest will be found indispensable
parties without whom the action cannot be commenced.
The court then concluded its decision by considering the issue
of the effect of the insurer's part payment, finding that such pay-
ment would operate to mitigate the defendant's liability by the
amount paid. To hold otherwise would not have been consistent
with the operation of the acceptance of the payment as an assign-
ment of a part of the claim. By such an assignment, the insurer
possessed its own claim which it must bring within the time pre-
scribed by the statute of limitations. Because Heritage's claim was
barred by the statute of limitations, to allow the plaintiff recovery
including the amount assigned would have defeated the purpose of
the statute of limitations in eliminating the insurer's claim.
A question remains as to when the procedure formulated in it
will be implemented. It would appear that an important distinction
affecting this determination might be drawn as to the type of insur-
ance contract upon which the insurer's payment is based. The
contract involved in Heifetz would be best characterized as
indemnity-type insurance, and thus, it is clear that as to this type
of insurance the procedure will apply. If, however, the insurance
would have been of the investment contract type, it would be rea-
sonable that the court would have decided differently on whether
the payment would mitigate the defendant's liability. The supreme
court in Heifetz makes no mention of this distinction, but such is
implicit in the decision due to the reliance of the court on Patitucci
v. Gerhardt?. As noted earlier, the holding in Patitucci that the
acceptance of partial payment from an insurer operates as an as-
signment pro tanto of the insured's claim and makes the insurer
an indispensable party formed a major basis for the Heifetz ruling.
However, the Patitucci case dealt with indemnity insurance, and
the court specifically stated that in the instance of investment in-
surance, the insurer is not subrogated and does not become a neces-
sary party by partial payment.24 In theory, the effect of this critical
distinction between indemnity and investment insurance has a logi-
cal basis. The purpose of indemnity insurance is to place the in-
jured in the same position he would have been in had there been
no injury,2 while investment-type insurance, for example life insur-
ance, pays a certain amount upon the happening of a specified
23. 206 Wis. 358, 240 N.W. 385 (1932).
24. Id. at 361, 240 N.W. at 386.
25. R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAw 88 and 319 (1971).
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event." This latter amount bears no relation to the actual damages
sustained by the insured. Although it is possible to identify this
distinction without the aid of comment by the Heifetz court, one
may nevertheless visualize problems in its application. Many poli-
cies written today contain provisions whose features share some of
the attributes of both indemnity and investment insurance, such as
accident and health policies. Thus, further clarification is needed
before it may be accurately predicted when the Heifetz rule will
apply.
C. Pleadings
During this term the supreme court dealt with some fine points
of complaint pleading. In Kruse v. Schieve 7 the plaintiff had been
injured operating machinery at her place of employment. She re-
ceived workmen's compensation and then commenced a third
party action against the defendant, a corporate officer. The com-
plaint alleged that the defendant was an "employee and vice-
president and as an employee and vice-president supervised the
engineering and maintenance and production in the factory" and
that he had been negligent "in his capacity as a coemployee and
as a person in charge of production and control of the employ-
ment." The defendant demurred on the ground that the exclusive
remedy provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act 8 forbids
a third party action against a corporate officer for acts done as an
officer. The plaintiff urged that the complaint alleged the negligent
acts as arising out of the defendant's status as a coemployee. The
trial court overruled the demurrer.
There is authority that a corporate officer may be sued as a
coemployee for common law negligence. 29 However, the supreme
court pointed out that in those cases the justices had not dealt
with ". . . any general duty or responsibility owed the employer
but with an affirmative act which increased the risk of injury.
[In those cases] the officer's or supervisory employee's affirma-
tive act of negligence went beyond the scope of the duty of the
26. W. VANCE, LAW OF INSURANCE § 134, at 797 (1951); see Kircher, Set-Off and
Subrogation in Automobile Medical Payments Coverage, 7 FOR THE DEFENSE No. 10
(1966).
27. 61 Wis. 2d 421, 213 N.W.2d 64 (1973).
28. WIs. STAT. § 102.03(2) (1971).
29. Pitrowski v. Taylor, 55 Wis. 2d 615, 201 N.W.2d 52 (1972); Wasley v. Kosmatka,
50 Wis. 2d 738, 184 N.W.2d 821 (1971); Hoeverman v. Feldman, 220 Wis. 557, 265 N.W.
580 (1936).
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employer . *.". ."3 Finding no such act on the part of the defen-
dant, the court concluded that the plaintiff had commingled
alternative theories of recovery, and that the theory based upon
the defendant's capacity as an officer did not state a cause of
action. Such was construed to be improper pleading and the de-
murrer to the complaint was necessarily sustained. "Such allega-
tions are construed as pleading the least, rather than the greatest
allegation, and are fatally defective if the least allegation does not
state a cause of action." 31 Thus, the plaintiff's attempt to bring a
third party action against a corporate officer for acts done as an
officer through this type of pleading was unsuccessful.
Another pleading problem was presented in the recent case of
Lorenz v. Dreske.3 2 In this action to recover unpaid salary for
services, the defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground
that the action was barred by the two year statute of limitations
section 893.21(5). 33 The plaintiff Lorenz was a doctor, and he had
claimed that the action fell within the exception for professional
services and therefore was not barred. The defendant argued that
an allegation of "professional services" was a conclusion of law,
while the plaintiff contended that it was a well-pleaded statement
of ultimate fact admitted by the demurrer.
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision to over-
rule the demurrer basing its result on essentially two grounds.
First, the question of professionalism was recognized as one of
mixed law and fact. Because the adjective "professional" is used
in a statute, it carries a legal definition from which legal conse-
quences flow. Also present is its common descriptive usage. "Mat-
ters of mixed law and fact, the ultimate of which is, in a broad
sense, a fact, may be pleaded according to their legal effect ...
[E]very reasonable intendment must be indulged in favor of the
pleading. ' 3 Second, the court noted that section 893.21(5) has
been given a broad interpretation in respect to what constitutes
professional services, and thus the court permits a greater degree
of flexibility to a litigant who relies on his professional status as a
30. 61 Wis. 2d at 428, 213 N.W.2d at 67, 68.
31. Id. at 431, 213 N.W.2d at 69; see Pavalon v. Thomas Holmes Corp., 25 Wis. 2d
540, 131 N.W.2d 331 (1964).
32. 62 Wis. 2d 273, 214 N.W.2d 753 (1974).
33. WIs. STAT. § 893.21(5) (1971) ". . . Within 2 years: . . . (5) Any action to recover
unpaid salary, wages or other compensation for personal services, except fees for profes-
sional services."
34. Schmidt v. Joint School Dist., 146 Wis. 635, 639, 132 N.W. 583, 584 (1911), quoted
in Larson v. Lester, 259 Wis. 440 at 443, 49 N.W.2d 414 at 416 (1951).
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means of avoiding a shorter statute of limitations. 5 The supreme
court concluded, as had the trial court, that because it could not
be determined that the services were not professional, the pleaded
facts were sufficient to constitute a cause of action which was not
barred by the statute of limitations.
D. Substitution of Judge
The timely request for a substitution of a new judge was the
issue in controversy in Pure Milk Products Coop. v. Nat'l Farmers
Organization.6 The defendant filed a request for substitution of
the judge after a preliminary hearing on a motion for temporary
injunction but before the case was noticed for trial.3 1
The rules for a timely request are stated in the recently revised
Wisconsin Statutes section 261.08(1) (1971):
• . . The written request shall be filed on or before the first day
of the term of court at which the case is triable or within 10 days
after the case is noticed for trial ...
A strict reading of section 261.08(1) would appear to qualify the
request in Pure Milk Products Coop. as timely under the section
allowing request "within 10 days after the case is noticed for trial."
The supreme court interpreted the statute to mean that a request
filed after commencement of the trial was untimely. The court
then held that although a trial had not been technically commenced
at the time of a hearing on a preliminary injunction, it was not the
intent of the legislature to allow a change of judges after the hear-
ing of a contested motion which implicates the merits and requires
the judge to accept evidence which would have a bearing on the
cause of action. Thus, this request was untimely.
This interpretation finds support in Wisconsin's case law39 and
in the law of other states." The court also pointed out that there
may be some types of preliminary proceedings after which the
35. Estate of Schroeder, 53 Wis. 2d 59, 191 N.W.2d 860 (1971); Younger v. Rosenow
Paper & Supply Co., 51 Wis. 2d 619, 188 N.W.2d 507 (1971).
36. 64 Wis. 2d 241, 219 N.W.2d 564 (1974).
37. See Wis. STAT. § 270.115 (1971).
38. See Luedtke v. Luedtke, 29 Wis. 2d 567, 139 N.W.2d 553 (1966); Swineford v.
Pomeroy, 16 Wis. 575 (1863).
39. In re Kuttig's Will, 260 Wis. 415, 50 N.W.2d 669 (1952); Duffy v. Hickey, 68 Wis.
380, 32 N.W. 54 (1889).
40. McClenny v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 36 Cal. Rptr. 459, 388 P.2d
691 (1964); Honolulu Roofing Co. v. Felix, 49 Haw. 578, 426 P.2d 298 (1967); People v.
Savaiano, 10 II. App. 3d 666, 294 N.E.2d 740 (1973); State v. Armijo, 39 N.M. 502, 50
P.2d 852 (1935).
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request would not be untimely. Proceedings where the evidence
bears only on collateral matters would fall in this category. The
result of Pure Milk Products Coop. is a sound one, but also indi-
cates that it would be much more desirable to have a statute which
states all the law it purports to state.
E. Summary Judgment
The inclusion of adverse examinations in the affidavits in sup-
port of or to refute a motion for summary judgment has become
a popular practice. The circumstances in the recent decision of
Commercial Discount Corp. v. Milwaukee Western Bank4 ap-
pears to demonstrate that attorneys have adopted the practice not
only to support their claims factually, but also to convince the
court, by the sheer volume of their support data, of the merit of
their claim. The supreme court in its holding in Commercial
Discount Corp. has placed a strong restriction on this procedure.
In Commercial Discount Corp., the plaintiff was suing to re-
cover funds possessed by the defendant on the grounds that the
defendant had aided and abetted a debtor of the plaintiff to divert
the funds from the plaintiff's rightful claim upon a prior perfected
security interest. The defendant moved for summary judgment,
and the parties submitted affidavits of fact which included exten-
sive adverse examinations. The plaintiff's examinations ran over
200 pages. The motion was denied.
In previous cases the supreme court has indicated its distaste
for the practice of including voluminous adverse examinations by
first stating its opinion that the practice was an imposition on the
trial court as well as appellate court," and later by announcing that
the counsel submitting the examination ought to indicate the por-
tions he believes most relevant. The court considering the matter
may order that such specification take place.43 The recurring
problem was presented in Commercial Discount Corp., and the
supreme court realized stronger measures were needed. The result
places the burden upon the attorney to indicate the relevant por-
tions at the risk of having his adverse ignored.
[ . . T]he party using such an examination shall specify which
portion thereof he deems to be material and on which he relies,
41. 61 Wis. 2d 671, 214 N.W.2d33 (1974).
42. Hyland Hall & Co. v. Madison Gas & Electric Co., 11 Wis. 2d 238, 247, 105
N.W.2d 305, 311 (1960).
43. Clark v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 21 Wis. 2d 268, 275, 124 N.W.2d
29, 33 (1963).
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and failure to do so shall constitute good cause for the trial court
or the Supreme Court to disregard the adverse in appraising the
motion."
The sanction is appropriate, and will no doubt be effective in trial
courts that employ it.
II. TRIAL
A. Right to Jury Trial
The question of waiver of jury trial was presented in
Theuerkauf v. Schnellbaecher 5 The defendant's attorney had
signed and filed a notice of readiness which had been served upon
him pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes section 270.115(1) by the
plaintiff's attorney. The notice stated that there was presented an
issue of fact for the court. Defendant later requested a jury trial.
The trial court held that the right had been waived by the signing
of the notice of readiness, where it was stated that the issue of fact
was to be tried to the court. The defendant claimed that such a
signing and filing could not operate as a waiver, because section
270.32 did not provide for such a manner of waiver, 6 and further
that in the case of Petition of Doar7 the supreme court had abro-
gated a provision for waiver by failure to make a timely demand.
The supreme court affirmed the trial court, dispelling the defen-
dant's argument by pointing out that the decision on Petition of
Doar rested on a failure of the waiver provision to complete its
purpose of promoting judicial economy, and not because the court
believed that this requirement put too high a procedural burden
upon the constitutional right to a jury trial. The court also stated
in support of its decision that section 270.32 does not preclude
other conditions for waiver, as is illustrated by Wisconsin cases
holding other conditions to be sufficient. 8 The court stated that
even if the defendant's argument had been valid, the signing and
filing of the notice of readiness qualified as a "written consent filed
44. 61 Wis. 2d at 678, 214 N.W.2d at 36, 37.
45. 64 Wis. 2d 79, 218 N.W.2d 295 (1974).
46. Wis. STAT. § 270.32 (1971) states: ". . . Trial by jury may be waived by the several
parties to an issue of fact by failing to appear at the trial; or by written consent filed with
the clerk; or by consent in open court, entered in the minutes."
47. 248 Wis. 113, 21 N.W.2d 1 (1945).
48. Leonard v. Rogan, 20 Wis. 568 (1866); McCormick v. Ketchum, 48 Wis. 643, 4
N.W. 798 (1880); Charles Baumbach Co. v. Hobkirk, 104 Wis. 488, 80 N.W. 70 (1899);
Wooster v. Weyh, 194 Wis. 85, 216 N.W. 138 (1927); Gifford v. Thur, 226 Wis. 630, 276
N.W. 348 (1938).
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with the clerk" under section 270.32, and therefore the defendant
had waived a jury trial in that fashion.
Thus, in Theuerkauf, the court not only enumerated a specific
set of factual circumstances by which a party may waive the right
to jury trial, but they also demonstrated that the present statutes
do not clearly state the law on the subject. It would appear that
the approval of the proposed new Wisconsin Rules of Civil Proce-
dure would simplify this matter considerably.49
B. The Jury
The plaintiffs in Nolan v. Venus Ford, Inc. 0 claimed that a
prospective juror could be disqualified for cause because of his
mere affiliation with an insurance company, even though that par-
ticular company was not concerned with the suit being litigated.
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's
challenges for cause, reiterating the rules regarding disqualification
of jurors. The rule of law regarding challenge for cause of jurors
is that the challenge may not be predicated on a ground not stated
in Wisconsin Statutes section 270.16.51 Thus, to disqualify a juror,
there must be affirmative proof of partiality..52 However, it is well
settled that the impaneling of the jury is within the discretion of
the trial court.53 The supreme court has stated:
Because it preserves the appearance as well as tie reality of
an impartial trial, the judge should honor challenges for cause
whenever he may reasonably suspect that circumstances outside
the evidence may create bias or appearance of bias.5
The plaintiffs had argued for the interpretation that a reasona-
ble suspicion of bias or prejudice is all that is necessary for disqual-
49. See 1973 Wis. L. REv., special edition, 72, 116. The proposed new Wisconsin Rules
of Civil Procedure, presently before the court on the petition of the Judicial Council for
promulgation under Wisconsin Statutes section 251.18 would provide for a demand-type
statute requiring a demand for jury trial at the pretrial conference; failure to do so would
consitute waiver.
50. 64 Wis. 2d 215, 218 N.W.2d 507 (1974).
51. Kanzenbach v. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 273 Wis. 621, 79 N.W.2d 249 (1956);
Good v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 265 Wis. 596, 62 N.W.2d 425 (1954); Maahs v. Schultz,
207 Wis. 624, 242 N.W. 195 (1932).
52. Kanzenbach v. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 273 Wis. 621, 626, 627, 79 N.W.2d 249,
252, 253 (1956); Good v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 265 Wis. 596, 598, 599, 62 N.W.2d 425,
426 (1954); Maahs v. Schultz, 207 Wis. 624, 242 N.W. 195 (1932).
53. Kanzanbach v. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 273 Wis. 621, 626, 79 N.W.2d 249, 253
(1956). Grace v. Dempsey, 75 Wis. 313, 320, 321, 43 N.W. 1127, 1129 (1889).
54. Kanzenbach v. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 273 Wis. 621 at 627, 79 N.W.2d 249 at
253 (1956).
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ification. It is clear however, that such is merely a caution to trial
courts, and that an abuse of discretion will only be found where
the trial court fails to disqualify a juror who has been affirmatively
proved biased or prejudiced. The denial of a challenge to jurors
affiliated with the insurance industry in the absence of such proof
is not an abuse of discretion.
C. Evidence and Witnesses
1. Video Taped Evidence
During the term, the supreme court took a significant step in
the interest of a greater ability of the trier of fact to evaluate
testimony which would otherwise be submitted in the form of writ-
ten deposition. In State ex rel. Johnson v. Circuit Court55 the peti-
tioner sought a writ of prohibition to prohibit the exclusion from
the evidence of videotape depositions in her cause of action for
negligence. The petitioner had been treated by doctors in Minneap-
olis who could not testify at the trial. The court noted that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for the acceptance of
videotape depositions into the evidence56 and placed the power to
do so in the discretion of the trial court until the supreme court
might publish further rules. The court also advised the trial courts
to act "in the interest of justice with due regard to the importance
of presenting testimony of witnesses orally in open court."57 Lan-
guage such as this seems to indicate that perhaps the courts will
impose a substantial burden of proof that the witnesses whose
testimony has been videotaped have been diligently sought for ac-
tual testimony, and are truly unavailable. Such is analogous to the
requirements in respect to the admissibility of secondary evidence
where the original of a writing or recording is claimed lost or
destroyed .
2. Expert Witnesses
The area of expert testimony provided considerable activity for
the Wisconsin Supreme Court during the recent term, and al-
though the court was not faced with any question of first impres-
55. 61 Wis. 2d 1, 212 N.W.2d 1 (1973).
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4).
57. 61 Wis. 2d at 3, 212 N.W.2d at 2.
58. See WISCONSIN RULES OF EVIDENCE, 59 Wis. 2d R357, § 910.04; Whalen v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 51 Wis. 2d 635, 187 N.W.2d 820 (1971); Harper, Drake & Ass'n.
v. Jewett & Slurman, 49 Wis. 2d 330, 182 N.W.2d 551 (1971); Peterson v. Warren, 31 Wis.
2d 547, 143 N.W.2d 560 (1966).
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sion and did not produce any new applications of rules, it is worth
noting their decisions on this subject.
In Johnson v. Heintz" the court reversed a judgment for the
plaintiff suing for damages incurred by a fall in her backyard when
her knee buckled. The plaintiff had previously been involved in an
automobile collision with the defendant, in which the knee was
originally damaged. The reversal was based on the ground that
there had been presented no expert testimony to prove that the
subsequent re-injury had been caused by the prior event. The Wis-
consin court has consistently held that such a matter is too sophis-
ticated for the average juror and an intelligent evaluation is impos-
sible without expert testimony."
Two cases dealt with the qualification of an expert witness. In
Lemberger v. Koehring,6 ' a retired civil navy engineer with four
years of experience in developing specifications for protective head
covering was held to be an expert as to the protection available in
the use of a hard hat. In the same case a neurologist was held not
to possess the qualifications of an expert on the same subject.
A licensed chiropractor was held competent to testify concern-
ing matters within the scope of chiropractic in Green v. Rosenow,2
although those areas may also be such that a licensed medical
doctor would be able to testify as an expert.
The decisions in Lemberger and Green are solidly based on
Wisconsin Rules of Evidence section 907.02.63 The emphasis is
upon the two-step process of qualification for admissibility; that is,
(1) whether the witness has knowledge, skill, experience, training
or education in a particular field and (2) whether his testimony will
assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determinat-
ing a fact in issue. No value is placed upon the label of a profession
or trade. These two decisions exemplify Wisconsin's simple and
progressive attitude toward expert qualification and admissibility
of expert testimony.64
59. 61 Wis. 2d 585, 213 N.W.2d 85 (1973).
60. Globe Steel Tubes Co. v. Industrial Comm., 251 Wis. 495, 29 N.W.2d 510 (1947).
61. 63 Wis. 2d 210, 216 N.W.2d 542 (1974).
62. 63 Wis. 2d 463, 217 N.W.2d 322 (1974).
63. WISCONSIN RULES OF EVIDENCE, 59 Wis. 2d R206 § 908.02:
. . . If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify in the form
of an opinion or otherwise.
64. See also State v. Johnson, 54 Wis. 2d 561, 196 N.W.2d 717 (1972); Netzel v. State
Sand & Gravel Co., 51 Wis. 2d 1, 186 N.W.2d 258 (1971).
19751
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
E. D. Wesley v. New Berlin65 presented the court with a contro-
versy involving the bases of opinion testimony by experts. The
plaintiff had offered a technical pamphlet into the evidence, but it
was excluded as hearsay on the ground that it lacked foundation
that its writer was recognized in his field as an expert. 6 The plain-
tiff then called a witness and qualified him as an expert in the field
involved. The expert gave opinion testimony based on the excluded
pamphlet. The defendant's objection was that the witness did not
qualify as an expert on the subject if his knowledge was based on
the pamphlet.
The supreme court found no merit in the defendant's objection
noting that it went to the weight of the expert's opinion not to his
qualifications. Section 907.03 of the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence
clearly allows such testimony, 7 and the court pointed out that all
expert testimony is based on hearsay and that implicit in the con-
cept of expert witnesses is the realization that the expert is the one
in the best position to accept or reject such hearsay.
D. Directed Verdict
The cases of Samson v. Riesing"8 and Tombal v. Farmer's
Insurance Exchange69 produced identical issues for the supreme
court. In each case the trial court had granted a motion for directed
verdict. On appeal the appellants argued that the supreme court's
preference for the procedure of reserving ruling on motions for
directed verdict until the jury has returned its verdict70 is manda-
tory for trial courts. The supreme court emphasized that this indi-
cation was an admonishment and nothing more, and that on appeal
the only issue was whether the trial court had erred in directing the
verdict. Both decisions affirmed the trial court, but observed that
the possibility of judicial economy may well be not worth the risk
of reversal and remand for a whole new trial.
65. 62 Wis. 2d 668, 215 N.W.2d 657 (1974).
66. WISCONSIN RULES OF EVIDENCE, 59 Wis. 2d R253 § 907.03(18).
67. WISCONSIN RULES OF EVIDENCE, 59 Wis. 2d R208, R209 § 907.03:
. . . The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence.
68. 62 Wis. 2d 698, 215 N.W.2d 662 (1974).
69. 62 Wis. 2d 64, 214 N.W.2d 291 (1974).
70. See Davis v. Skille, 12 Wis. 2d 482, 107 N.W.2d 458 (1961).
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E. Instructions and Verdicts
The Wisconsin Supreme Court created a new rule relating to
instructions to the jury in Bohlman v. American Family Mutual
Insurance Co.71 In that case the defendant moved for a new trial
after the jury had returned with the verdict. One of the grounds was
the failure to give requested instructions to the jury. The supreme
court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion on the ground
that defendant's attorney had participated with the other attorney
in chambers with the judge in drafting the instructions. He had not
objected to the omission of his proposed instruction. The policy of
requiring an objection at the earliest practical time to prevent
waiver7 2 was applied strictly in this case. Defendant's attorney's
failure to state a reservation for the record operated as an implied
consent to waive the objection. Participation in drafting and modi-
fying the instructions is necessary for the rule in the Bohiman case
to apply.
The appellant in Naden v. Johnson73 claimed that the court
had erred in employing the use of a special verdict limited to
questions of ultimate fact instead of specific inquiries into the facts.
He based his claim on the fact that this was an action for breach
of contract. The court was quick to point out that the use of an
ultimate fact verdict is not restricted to negligence cases74 and that
the form of the verdict is discretionary.75 There is no reason why
the positive attributes of the ultimate fact verdict may not be ap-
plied to the issues in a breach of contract action. The court noted
that while more specific inquiries may have been favorable, it is not
an abuse of discretion to use the ultimate fact verdict in contract
actions.
III. POST-TRIAL
A. Execution
In the area of execution of judgments, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court was presented with a case which was decided directly on
procedural considerations. In Wilson v. Craite" a successful pur-
71. 61 Wis. 2d 718, 214 N.W.2d 52 (1974).
72. See Savina v. Wisconsin Gas Co., 36 Wis. 2d 694, 154 N.W.2d 237 (1967).
73. 61 Wis. 2d 375, 212 N.W.2d 585 (1973).
74. Wis. STAT. § 270.27 (1971).
75. Gilbert v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 49 Wis. 2d 193, 181 N.W.2d 527 (1970). Dahl
v. K-Mart, 46 Wis. 2d 605, 176 N.W.2d 342 (1970).
76. 60 Wis. 2d 350, 210 N.W.2d 700 (1973).
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chaser of some real property at an execution sale claimed that he
had bid an excessive price and therefore refused to pay the pur-
chase price. The judgment creditor petitioned the court to direct
the purchaser to show cause why he should not be required to pay.
The trial court held the price excessive and set aside the sale.
The property was located in Waukesha County and had origi-
nally belonged to the defendant-debtor Craite, against whom a
judgment was rendered in Milwaukee County. The plaintiff-
creditor Wilson had the judgment docketed in Waukesha County
and a writ of execution was issued from a Waukesha County court.
The sale followed. The purchaser argued not only that he had paid
an excessive price, but also that the Waukesha County Court had
no authority to issue execution because the procedures required
had not been followed. The supreme court rejected the purchaser's
claim grounded on excessive price, but concluded that the entire
execution proceeding was void for lack of jurisdiction of the Wau-
kesha court.
A Wisconsin Statute requires that "[tlhe execution must be
issued from . . . the court . . . where the judgment roll, or a
certified copy thereof . . . is filed."" The judgment roll includes
the judgment, ". . . summons, pleadings, verdicts, offers, excep-
tions, ahd all orders and papers in any way involving the merits
and necessarily affecting the judgment. 7 8 The supreme court
stated affirmatively that the provision of the statutes relating to
execution of judgments and proceedings thereunder are absolutely
mandatory and cited ample precedent for this policy.79 The credi-
tor's filing of the judgment was thus ineffective to confer jurisdic-
tion upon the Waukesha court to issue the execution. Under sec-
tion 272.07 the docketing of the judgment in Waukesha County
would have subjected the debtor's lands in Waukesha County and
allowed the Milwaukee court to issue execution to the sheriff in
Waukesha County. Nevertheless, the proceeding was declared en-
tirely void.
The court emphatically sets out the option for the judgment
creditor in respect to property of the debtor in a county outside
that which rendered the judgment. He may file a copy of the judg-
ment in the county where the land is situated and have the court
which gave judgment issue execution on it; or he may file the
77. Wis. STAT. § 272.05 (1971).
78. 60 Wis. 2d at 358, 210 N.W.2d at 704; see Wis. STAT. § 270.72 (1955).
79. See Bugbee v. Lombard, 88 Wis. 271, 60 N.W. 414 (1894); Kentzler v. Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 47 Wis. 641, 3 N.W. 369 (1879).
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judgment roll in the county where the land is situated and confer
jurisdiction upon that county's court to issue execution. No other
method is acceptable.
IV. APPEAL
A. Parties on Appeal
In Coraci v. Noack0 the Wisconsin Supreme Court was faced
with a problem of parties on appeal and section 274.12 of the
Wisconsin Statutes. The court promoted its policy of seeking an
orderly procedure upon appeal wherein a settlement of the entire
controversy can be accomplished without successive appeals.', In
Coraci the court found that a judgment creditor of a purchaser-
assignor under a land contract was not an adverse respondent to
the assignee who appealed from an action for strict foreclosure, in
which all three of these parties were named defendants. Thus, the
creditor could not make a motion for review under section
274.12(1) which requires such adversity, and was also prevented
from filing a cross-appeal under section 274.12(3) and (4) because
the thirty day limitation had already passed. The creditor had
waived his right to review.
However, the court took note of the fact that the assignee had
served all parties with a notice of appeal and that this conferred
personal jurisdiction upon the court as to all the parties.82 There-
fore, the court was able to find the creditor as an additional party
under section 274.12(6). The decision is consistent with Wisconsin
case law as respects the court's inherent power over appellate pro-
cedure.13
B. Time of Appeal
Two cases regarding the timeliness of appeal came before the
court this term. The plaintiffs in Weiland v. Department of
Transportation4 claimed that the defendant's appeal should be
dismissed. The plaintiffs contended that section 32.05(l1)(c))5
prevented the defendant's appeal after sixty days when the pay-
80. 61 Wis. 2d 183, 212 N.W.2d 164 (1973).
81. American Wrecking Co. v. McManus, 174 Wis. 300, 181 N.W.235 (1921).
82. Turk v. H. C. Prange Co., 18 Wis. 2d 547, 119 N.W.2d 365 (1963).
83. See Gertz v. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co., 153 Wis. 475, 140 N.W. 312 (1913).
84. 62 Wis. 2d 456, 215 N.W.2d 455 (1974).
85. Wis. STAT. § 32.05(1 1)(c) (1969): "All monies payable under this subsection shall
be paid within 60 days after entry of judgment unless within such period an appeal is taken
to the supreme court."
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ment of the judgment was withheld. The court ruled that this line
of construction was erroneous. Section 32.05(1 1)(c), requires that
a party who desires to withhold the payment of judgment pending
appeal must appeal within sixty days. After sixty days, a valid
appeal may be brought but payment may also be enforced upon
the judgment. Wisconsin Statute section 32.05(13) provides six
months to appeal from a circuit court judgment.
In Beloit Corp. v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human
Relations" the employer's appeal from an order of the ILHR
Department awarding an increased death benefit on a workmen's
compensation claim was held to be untimely. Wisconsin Statute
section 102.25(1) provides for a thirty day period to make the
appeal after service of'notice of entry of judgment. On November
7, 1972, the attorney general mailed a notice of entry of judgment
to the employer's attorney. On November 24, the attorney signed
the admission of service card and returned it by mail to the attor-
ney general. The attorney general received a notice of appeal on
December 15, 1972. The employer's major contention was that the
service of entry of judgment was not effective until November 24
when the admission of service was signed.
The court rejected the employer's argument showing that the
employer's attorney was operating as the employer's agent and
that service by mail is permissible. Service by mail is provided for
in the statutes,87 and it is to be complete upon mailing. The statutes
also provide for the addition of five days to the time in which to
appeal when service is by mail.8 Finally the court stated that there
is no requirement that the residences must be in different munici-
palities for service by mail to be used,89 as contended by the em-
ployer. Hence, the employer's notice of appeal was due within
thirty-five days after the notice of entry of judgment was mailed
to his attorney, November 7, 1972. This notice of appeal on De-
cember 15 was eight days late.
C. Appellate Rules of Decision
The supreme court in Herro, McAndrews, & Porter v.
Gerhardt" was presented with yet another action for the recovery
of attorney's fees. In this case the court overruled its previous
86. 63 Wis. 2d 23, 216 N.W.2d 233 (1974).
87. WIs. STAT. § 269.34 (1971).
88. WIS. STAT. § 269.36 (1971).
89. Estate of Callahan, 251 Wis. 247, 29 N.W.2d 352 (1947).
90. 62 Wis. 2d 179, 214 N.W.2d 401 (1974).
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statements in Knoll v. Klatt 1 and Estate of Marotz92 and formally
adopted the rule of Touchett v. E Z Paintr Corp.13 The abrogated
rule viewed the trial court's finding as to the value of attorney's
fees as a finding of fact, which must be sustained unless clearly
unreasonable and against the great weight and clear preponderance
of the evidence. The court opted instead for the "independent re-
view test" by which the supreme court on appeal will solely deter-
mine whether the fees are reasonable without regard to the trial
court's finding. "The practice of law in the broad sense, both in
and out of the courts, is such a necessary part of and is so inexora-
bly connected with the exercise of the judicial power that this court
should continue to exercise its supervisory control of the practice
of law."94
MARK S. YOUNG
COMMERCIAL LAW
I. CORPORATIONS
A. Application of Wisconsin Law to Shareholders of Foreign
Corporations
It is an elementary rule of law that the state of incorporation
may regulate its corporation's "internal affairs," that is, matters
affecting the relations of the shareholders, officers, and directors
among themselves. When states other than the charter state at-
tempt to control corporate affairs, the waters are no longer so
clear. In Joncas v. Krueger,' the Wisconsin Supreme Court faced
a fact situation presenting a question at the fringes of the problem
of applying state law to foreign corporations. Unfortunately, the
decision left the issues more clouded than before.
In Joncas, a Delaware corporation licensed and doing business
in Wisconsin became insolvent and made a voluntary assignment
for the benefit of creditors. The assets were insufficient to satisfy
the wage claims of some of the corporate employees. Certain of
91. 43 Wis. 2d 265, 168 N.W.2d 555 (1969).
92. 263 Wis. 99, 56 N.W.2d 856 (1953).
93. 14 Wis. 2d 479, Il1 N.W.2d 419 (1961).
94. In re Integration of Bar, 5 Wis. 2d 618, 622, 93 N.W.2d 601, 603 (1958).
1. Joncas v. Krueger, 61 Wis. 2d 529, 213 N.W.2d 1 (1973).
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